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This paper examines the idea of peasant conservatism as a part of the body of 
modernisation theory and the role of (applied) anthropologists in helping to construct 
and legitimise that concept.
1 It considers how such views reflected Western concerns 
during the Cold War when peasant mobilisation for radical reform was a pre-eminent 
feature of the Third World landscape and it explores how it lent credibility to many of 
the assumptions on which the U.S. strategy of ‘community development’ was based. 
Particular attention is paid to the Cornell Peru Project at Vicos in the Peruvian 
highlands as one of the classic examples of applied anthropology and of the 
contradictions that this sub-discipline embodied. 
                                                 
1This paper was first presented at the annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association in 
Chicago (19-22 November 2003) and, shortly thereafter, in the seminar series, ‛Global Development, 
Population and Rural Livelihoods’ at the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague (15 December). I’m 
grateful to Dustin Wax for inviting me to present the paper initially in the AAA session which he 
organised and, subsequently, for supportive comments from David Stoll, William Mitchell, Raj Patel 
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Peasants, as George Foster once noted, did not really become an explicit 
subject of anthropological study until after the Second World War (Foster 1967:4). 
The reason for this, which did not concern him however, is very much part of the 
history of the Cold War. As such, the new interest in peasants that emerged rather 
rapidly in the nineteen-fifties was associated, sometimes explicitly, often not, with 
‘modernisation theory’, a highly influential body of writing through which Western 
academics and policy-makers described certain goals – and the way to achieve them –
as desirable for the developing world (cf. Latham 2000). 
Such writing, it has since become clear (Ross 1998b, Cumings 1998), was a 
part of the West’s strategic and ideological response to a post-war world of insurgent 
peasantries whose aspirations filled it with foreboding because, in the words of former 
U.S. Secretary of Defense and ex-World Bank president Robert McNamara, a 
‘sweeping surge of development…[had] turned traditionally listless areas of the world 
into seething caldrons of change’ (cited in Shafer 1988:80). Such views were not new. 
Stanford economist Eugene Staley had made much the same point, more elaborately, 
a decade earlier, in the year that the Vietnamese defeated the French colonial army at 
Dien Bien Phu: 
Countries in early stages of modernization – the underdeveloped countries of today 
– are the most vulnerable. The impact of a new commercial and industrial culture 
breaks down the old pattern of life and the old social system. Only gradually can 
the society find the necessary new adjustments and learn to operate satisfactorily a 
more complex and dynamic modern system. The period of transition gives the 
Communists, with their tactics of hatred and force, their deceptively simple 
solution (Staley 1954: 111-112). 
Hence, according to Staley, and many others: 
Underdeveloped countries have become the weakest links in the world system of 
capitalism which it is the Communist aim to overthrow and to conquer (Staley 
1954: 119).
2 
                                                 
2Such views made Staley an obvious choice seven years later, when the Kennedy Administration 
needed an academic to visit South Vietnam to advise on the best way for it to mobilise for a more 
intensive war against communist influence in rural areas (Scheer 1995:153). Staley’s report took as its 
point of departure the assumption that  
Viet Nam is today under attack in a bitter, total struggle which involves its survival as a 
free nation. Its enemy, the Viet Cong, is ruthless, resourceful, and elusive. This enemy is 
supplied, reinforced, and centrally directed by the international Communist apparatus 
operating through Hanoi. To defeat it requires the mobilization of the entire economic, 
military psychological, and social resources of the country and vigorous support 
from the United States (Gravel 1971). 
This assessment, which was less the view of a rigorous economist than of a Cold War ideologue, 
encouraged Washington to increase its military support for its client state of South Vietnam. 
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As I have discussed elsewhere (Ross 1998), such ideas were strongly coloured 
by Malthusian thinking which had a long history of obscuring the root causes of 
poverty and inequality and which, in the decades following the Second World War, 
lent force to the view that the adverse effects of the modernisation process had their 
origin more in population pressures than in economic or social injustice. But, the main 
source of the concern that lay behind such arguments was how to deal with the rising 
tide of rural mobilisation and insurgency that seemed to have become a dominant 
feature of the global political landscape and which was unavoidably linked in the 
capitalist West with the advance of communism. 
The decisive moment was the Communist Chinese revolution in 1949, when 
the attention of Western policy-makers – and, with them, the Ford, Rockefeller and 
Carnegie Foundations, which were increasingly intertwined with the highest echelons 
of the U.S. government – turned to South Asia (and most notably to India), as the 
region that seemed most vulnerable to immediate communist influence, precisely 
because – according to the Cold War Malthusian thinking exemplified by Frank 
Notestein, director of the Rockefeller-sponsored Population Council and his 
colleague, Kingsley Davis, at Princeton’s Office of Population Research (OPR) – it 
was ‘the glut of people in the poorer areas’ of that region that made them ‘conducive 
to communism’ (cited in: Wilmoth and Ball 1992: 647).
 3, 4 
Notestein underscored that what Asia – and, by inference, the rest of the 
developing world- – needed most was not land reform and social justice, but a cheap 
and effective method of contraception. ‘We doubt’, he wrote, on his return from a 
Rockefeller Foundation-sponsored survey of the Far East and Southeast Asia in 1948, 
‘that any other work offers a better opportunity for contributing to Asia’s and the 
world’s fundamental problems of human welfare’ (cited in: Caldwell and Caldwell 
                                                 
3Paul Hoffman, who became the head of the Ford Foundation in 1951 had previously been in charge of 
the Marshall Plan (Ross 1998:144).  In 1952, Rockefeller Foundation president, John Foster Dulles, 
became (republican) Eisenhower's Secretary of State --just as Dean Rusk would, under (democrat) 
Kennedy eight years later.  John J. McCloy, former head of the World Bank, served informally as 
Eisenhower's chief political adviser during the fifties, while he was simultaneously head of the Ford 
Foundation, chair of the Rockefellers' Chase Manhattan Bank and head of the Council on Foreign 
Relations (Bird 1992:108, 426-9).  One of his successor's as head of the Ford Foundation, McGeorge 
Bundy, had been a prominent adviser to Kennedy and Johnson (Ross 1998:195). 
4Notestein was the individual who had most helped to adapt demographic transition theory to the 
imperatives of the Cold War (Ross 1998: 87-95; cf. Hodgson 1983). 
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1986:1 9).
5 This prescription, which peasants did not seem to endorse, had its 
counterpart in another (intertwined) strategy to forestall radical agrarian 
transformation: what came to be called the Green Revolution.
6 
In a paper to The Eighth International Conference of Agricultural Economists 
in 1952, it was Notestein again who observed that, if modernisation typically brought 
disorder, increased food production might be a way to ameliorate it. But, echoing the 
views that the Rockefeller Foundation had developed over many decades of support 
for agricultural missionary work in pre-revolutionary China (Ross 1998: 139-144), he 
argued that this must only be achieved through moderate change (Notestein 1953:26). 
As with fertility, this meant relying primarily on technological innovation. And, as the 
prevailing view was that ‘The social organization of a peasant society is ill-adapted to 
the achievement of high technological proficiency’ (Notestein 1953), a view that was 
consistent with the main tenets of dominant modernisation theory (cf. Lerner 1958, 
Hagen 1962), this necessarily implied that it would have to be large land-owners and 
commercial farmers to whom the task of agricultural innovation would be entrusted.
7 
So it was that writers – many of them (such as sociologist Daniel Lerner and 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz) associated with the Center for International Studies 
(CENIS)(see below) at Harvard/MIT – embarked on the quest to identify local 
counterparts to Weber’s Protestant capitalists, who could oppose radical change, in 
the words of Milton Singer, with “‛compromise formations’ which with varying 
degrees of stability combine novel and traditional elements” (Singer 1972: 248-249). 
In this manner, modernisation theory was not only a reaction to the post-war 
advance of a socialist development alternative, but became, in the hands of many 
academics (including anthropologists), a way of mystifying the very origins of 
peasant discontent which seemed so threatening to Western dominance during the 
days of the Cold War. Such thinking would not only make peasant unrest seem to be 
unrelated to the history or to the nature of the global economy; it would also help to 
                                                 
5On that basis, in 1952, when John D. Rockefeller 3
rd convened a special ‘crisis conference’ on 
population in Williamsburg, Virginia (Caldwell and Caldwell 1986:25), it was Notestein who 
formulated the agenda (Ryder 1984:13). 
6As the classic work of Mahmood Mamdani has clearly demonstrated (1972). 
7One of the most famous and influential U.S. agricultural missionaries in China, John Lossing Buck, 
had already noted in the years just after World War I, when he was working at the Presbyterian mission 
in Nanhsuchow, that ‘resident landlords were the best hope for introducing new ideas in to agriculture 
because they were educated, they could understand, and they were well enough off to try something 
new’ (Buck 1962: 10). 
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rationalize a whole new set of post-war strategies – foremost among them, the Green 
Revolution – which would advance Western interests and further intensify rural 
inequalities. In this, anthropology had an especially important role to play by helping 
to create the myth that peasants – despite being regarded as a reservoir of radical 
political change throughout the Third World – were somehow too conservative in 
their cultural values to be autonomous agents of rural change, let alone of agricultural 
innovation. Agrarian change was therefore argued to be something that had to be 
guided by outsiders – as long as they were not communist ‛agitators’, but Westerners 
– many of whom would work within the framework of what became known as 
‘community development’, with its emphasis on changing – that is, Westernizing—
‛traditional’ attitudes and values. 
 
 
2 THE  EMERGENCE  OF  ‛APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY’ 
Thus, in 1961, anthropologist Charles Erasmus, in a book entitled Man Takes 
Control: Cultural Development and American Aid, fervently proclaimed that ‘Even in 
countries that have not yet had land reforms, I do not think that the major problem is 
who owns the land or how large the holdings are’ (Erasmus 1961: 326). It was a view 
that was certainly at odds with the experience of, for example, the UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America (UNECLA 1968) and of later writers on peasant 
economy such as Griffin (1979), Byres and Crow (1988) and others. But, Erasmus 
subscribed to the values of an era which suggested that developing countries would be 
better off if they could be refashioned in the image of the United States.
8 The main 
problem, in Erasmus’s view, was only for the U.S. to ‘make sure that we are 
providing sufficient incentive for those best qualified to help win the race for free 
society’ against what he called ‘coercive society’, an allusion to communism and 
socialism (Erasmus 1961:331). It was not a view that was conducive to an objective 
appraisal of the contradictions of contemporary development or of the realties of 
peasant livelihoods. 
                                                 
8Or as Adolph Berle, a prominent member of FDR’s government, close associate of Nelson Rockefeller 
and member of the Council on Foreign Relations, put it: ‘The ideal of every sincere agrarian reformer 
is to produce a situation something like that in the United States, where on a relatively small farm a 
family cannot only live but live in comfort’ (Berle 1962: 55). 
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The Cold War did not just define the whole point of development for such 
writers. A significant number of anthropologists who worked for government 
agencies, directly or indirectly, did so – as Erasmus and George Foster did – under the 
heading of what came to be called ‘applied anthropology’, the society for which had 
been established in 1941, and aligned themselves with the implicit objectives of U.S. 
government policy. Without seeming to feel any need to criticise the aims of such 
policy, they sought simply to demonstrate how anthropology could help to make such 
policy more effective. 
This was the import of the address to the 23
rd annual meeting of the society in 
1962 by Ward Goodenough, author of Cooperation in Change: An Anthropological 
Approach to Community Development (1966), when he noted that anthropologists 
could meet a growing demand by government for the behavioural sciences, but that 
this required the discipline to be more operational if it was really to fulfil the 
‘intelligence-gathering function’ that he felt applied anthropology did so well (1962: 
174).
9 
Goodenough specifically regarded the U.S. Army as a notable ‘potential 
market for the ethnographic skills of anthropologists‛.
10 The timing is interesting. 
Peasant insurgency had dominated the minds of Western policy-makers ever since the 
dramatic victory of the Chinese communists in 1949. In 1954, the Vietnamese victory 
at Dien Bien Phu had coincided with the election of Jácobo Arbenz as president of 
Guatemala and the beginning of one of the most important land reforms that Latin 
America had ever witnessed—and one which the U.S. subverted through military 
intervention. By 1959, the Cuban Revolution had taken place and, just a few years 
later, when Goodenough gave his talk, the U.S. was committing growing numbers of 
troops to a counter-insurgency war in Southeast Asia (Gettleman et al. 1995). 
Goodenough’s view of the contribution that anthropology could make to this effort 
was unambiguous and, in retrospect, alarming in its implications: ‘The successful 
conduct of modern guerilla warfare’, he wrote: 
                                                 
9 In his call for anthropologists to provide government with the "'dictionary' and 'grammar' of social 
conduct" that agencies --such as USAID-- wanted (Goodenough 1962:176), one can see the rationale 
for the ethnoscience with which Goodenough would be identified over the following years.  
10 Just after the Second World War, Goodenough had himself participated, along with George Peter 
Murdock, in a U.S. Navy-sponsored project, one of the largest in which anthropologists had ever en-
gaged, known as the Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology (CIMA).  It was intended 
to help the U.S. manage its new Pacific island possessions. 
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obviously requires both extensive and intensive ethnographic intelligence. At 
present, it is impossible to say what requests, if any, for our ethnographic services 
may emerge from government agencies, but there are straws in the wind 
suggesting that we may be called upon (Goodenough 1962: 175). 
 
Making Anthropology Useful 
Of course, Goodenough was hardly alone in considering ways to ensure that 
anthropology could be as useful in the Cold War period as it had been during the 
preceding world war, when Washington had employed anthropologists – as Harvard’s 
Clyde Kluckhohn observed in Mirror for Man (1967) – in ‘Military intelligence, the 
Department of State, OSS [Office of Strategic Services], Board of Economic Warfare, 
the Strategic Bombing Survey, the Military Government, Selective Service 
Organization, Office of Naval Intelligence, the Office of War Information, the FBI’, 
etc (cited in: Colby and Dennett 1995: 130). Kluckhohn was in an especially good 
position to know.  He himself had served with the OSS (the precursor of the CIA) 
during the war and continued to work within the broad intelligence community in the 
decades thereafter, most notably as the head of Harvard’s Russian Research Center. 
That Center – funded by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, but especially by the 
Carnegie Corporation – was, as Bruce Cumings has noted, ‘based on the wartime OSS 
model…[and] deeply involved with the CIA, the FBI, and other intelligence and 
military agencies’ (Cumings 1998: 165).
11 
Kluckhohn was one of the most prominent of the figures in post-war U.S. an-
thropology who maintained a close involvement in U.S. Cold War strategic activities 
and who reflected a widespread view that anthropology had little to lose from such 
associations.  In the process, this meant reshaping the discipline to establish new 
alignments with old sources of finance –Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie among 
them—that were already deeply embedded in the U.S. structure and with new ones, 
such as  Axel Wenner-Gren’s Viking Fund  (later called the Wenner-Gren Foundation 
                                                 
11The most detailed account of the emergence and the activities of Harvard’s Russian Research Center 
is Sigmund Diamond’s notable work, Compromised Campus (1992:50-110). 
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for Anthropological Research).
12 
This all took place as U.S. anthropology underwent a major reorganisation, at 
the heart of which was a major restructuring of its professional association, the 
American Anthropological Association. As David Price has observed, it was 
essentially the promise of funding – much of it related to the priorities of the Cold 
War – that drove this process. One of the consequences was that the Association was 
reluctant to be seen to voice any criticism of the West’s stance in the Cold War or of 
the wave of anti-communism that swept across the political landscape of the United 
States during the late nineteen-forties and -fifties. 
By 1947, the House Committee on Un-American Activities was already 
investigating Hollywood. Within a few more years, McCarthyism was in full swing 
and by 1954 the so-called Reece Committee – the Special Committee to Investigate 
Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations – was casting a shadow over 
many philanthropic organisations and tax-exempt professional associations. As the 
Committee’s chief counsel, Rene Wormser, wrote, ‘the emphasis on a search for 
organized Communist penetration of foundations absorbed much of the energy of the 
investigators’ (NameBase 2003). The Committee’s targets included the Social Science 
Research Council (Worcester nd: 26-30), in which the AAA had played an important 
role since its inception in 1924. But, more importantly, as Frederick Johnson, 
Executive Secretary of the AAA, wrote to one of U.S. anthropology’s pre-eminent 
figures, Julian Steward, in 1954, the Reece Committee had ‘put its finger upon the 
Association’ (Johnson 1954: 1). As the AAA was in the process of a reorganisation 
which was meant to attract government and foundation funding, it was under great 
                                                 
12The Swedish industrialist and millionaire, Axel Wenner-Gren, was once widely known for his 
associations with the interests of Germany, before, during and after the Nazi era. As a result, he had 
been blacklisted by the U.S. and British governments during the Second World War (Ross 1999). 
Despite this, in the decade after the war, the Fund developed ‘a symbiotic relationship with 
anthropology, playing a key role in supporting the growth of the field’ (Anon 1989:551). The question 
that ultimately needs to be addressed is why the U.S. anthropological community was so willing to 
overlook the nature of Wenner-Gren’s Nazi sympathies. The answer lies principally in the process of 
professionalizing anthropology which, especially in a time of political repression, made a special virtue 
of pragmatism. Besides, by the late ‘forties, former Nazi sympathies were no longer a liability. On the 
contrary. So, when, Ashley Montagu wrote to Margaret Mead in January, 1946, about his concern that 
the Viking Fund was financed by a ‘well-known Nazi sympathizer’, Mead quickly dismissed his 
qualms: 
To say that because money has been badly come by it should not be used for a 
good cause seems highly sentimental.  Perhaps all the more because it has been 
badly come by it should be used for a good cause (Howard 1984: 272). 
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pressure, as Steward had replied, to dissociate it from any hint that it was anything 
other than “‘a purely scientific organization’ without political orientation” (Steward 
March 9 1954). 
One result was that the anthropological establishment was not only weak in its 
support for colleagues being harassed by the FBI, but that some leading figures – most 
notably George Peter Murdock, who became president of the Association in 1955 – 
actually launched pre-emptive strikes against their colleagues (Price 1997, 1998, 
2000) and informed for the FBI because they professed to believe that the AAA was 
under threat from left-wing members (Price 1997). Others countenanced various 
degrees of collaboration between the AAA and the CIA (Price 2000) while still others 
actively, if covertly, worked with the intelligence services in the course of their 
academic activities. 
Most notable among the latter group was Kluckhohn. The fact that the Russian 
Research Centre at Harvard, of which he was the director (Ross 1998b:488), was 
‘deeply involved with the CIA’ (Cumings 1998: 165) and that one of the Centre’s 
projects had involved bringing Nazi collaborators into the U.S. (Price 1998; 
Oppenheimer 1997), may help to explain why McCarthy’s investigations at Harvard, 
in the words of Talcott Parsons, ‘did not even mention the Russian Research Center’ 
(Parsons and Vogt 1962: 147). So, it was also convenient that Kluckhohn was ‘one of 
the principal advisors to and participants in the activities of the Wenner-Gren 
Foundation’ (Parsons and Vogt 1962: 146), which did so much to finance the 
professionalisation of anthropology during the nineteen-fifties. 
 
 
3 THE  FOUNDATIONS  AND THE COLD WAR: THE CASE OF FORD 
The Wenner-Gren Foundation, however, was far less important that the great 
philanthropic foundations such as Rockefeller, Carnegie, Kellogg and Ford, which, by 
1950, were influential actors in the making of U.S. policy, both at home and abroad, 
and which helped to shape the contours of Western development policy into which 
anthropology sought to insert itself. 
If these foundations all reflected, from their inception, the interests of the U.S. 
ruling elite class, it was the Chinese Revolution in 1949 which most helped to shape 
their modern role in the making of U.S. foreign policy. In this regard, the Rockefeller 
Foundation was clearly affected because of its long-standing involvement in China, in 
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support of missionary activities and the marketing of the products of Standard Oil, 
which was the ultimate source of the Foundation’s wealth.
13 But, in many ways the 
impact of events in China was even greater on the Ford Foundation, with resources 
that dwarfed those of Rockefeller (Mattelart 1979:156).
14 
The Ford Foundation was relatively parochial in its activities until the late 
1940s when a report by California lawyer, H. Rowan Gaither – who had just helped to 
organise the RAND Corporation (with Ford support) as a non-profit Air Force think-
tank focusing of issues of ‘national security’ (Snead 1999: 51) – helped to define a 
new agenda for the Foundation which set it firmly within the framework of the 
emergent Cold War. The report noted: 
As the tide of communism mounts in Asia and Europe the position of the United 
States is crucial. We are striving at great cost to strengthen free peoples 
everywhere. The needs of such peoples, particularly in underdeveloped areas, are 
vast and seemingly endless, yet their eventual well-being may prove essential to 
our security (quoted in: Rosen 1985: 4). 
 
Thus, according to George Rosen, an economist who worked both for the Ford 
Foundation and RAND, ‘when the foundation began to consider its larger role, there 
was certainly an implicit, if not explicit, agreement between the assumptions and 
broad policy conclusions of the authors of the Gaither report [for Ford] and the 
assumptions underlying American foreign policy at the time’ (1985: 7). 
This was underscored by way the Foundation, in the wake of Gaither’s report, 
had enlarged its board of trustees, affirming its increasingly intimate relationship to 
Washington policy-makers.  One of the new board members, for example, was John J. 
McCloy (a long-standing partner in the Rockefeller law-firm of Milbank, Tweed) 
(Bird 1992:273-274), who had just left the presidency of the World Bank. The first 
director after the reorganisation was Paul Hoffman, the former president of the 
Studebaker Corporation and the recent head of the Marshall Plan (Caldwell and 
Caldwell 1986: 20-21; Rosen 1985: 7-8). Hoffman later went on to head the UN 
Development Program (Raffer and Singer 1996: 61). 
 
                                                 
13Tuchman has observed – and the Rockefellers were the best evidence – that ‘American infiltration of 
China...was a two-pronged affair of business and gospel’ (1971: 38). 
14In 1951, Ford assets were estimated at ‘between $750,000,000 and $1 billion, depending on appraisal 
of the value of the Ford stock’ (Golden 1951). 
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Another notable figure was Joseph Slater, who had served as secretary-general 
of the Allied High Commission for Germany in the nineteen-forties and had then been 
the chief economist for the Creole Petroleum Corporation, a subsidiary of 
Rockefeller’s Standard Oil of New Jersey. Before going to Ford, to run its 
International Affairs Program (Caldwell and Caldwell 1986:49), he had served as the 
Staff Director of the Draper Committee, which Mass has described as ‘the first 
official body of the U.S. government to advocate Neo-Malthusian policies’ (Mass 
1976: 41; Piotrow 1973: 36 ff; Ross 1998b: 95-100).
15 
 
Not surprisingly, according to Rosen, 
The foundation staff…soon established a more or less informal network of 
relationships with officials of various public agencies, American and international, 
working in the foreign development field, including the State Department, the 
Point Four organization, the United Nations, and the Food and Agricultural 
Organization; with the Rockefeller Foundation, another nonprofit private 
foundation with lengthy experience in Asia and elsewhere… (Rosen 1985:8). 
 
Hoffman’s writings after he had taken over as head of the Foundation make 
even clearer the extent to which, at the beginning of the fifties, the thinking of Ford 
leadership exemplified the Cold War rhetoric which prevailed in Washington. Like 
many of his contemporaries, Hoffman’s vision of the world as the Korean War was 
beginning was uncompromisingly Manichean. As he wrote in his book, Peace can be 
won: 
...the Kremlin is looking with ever more naked avidity upon the oil fields of Iran 
and Saudi Arabia. In Indonesia, Communist agitation, subversion, propaganda and 
sabotage are increasing in speed and scope. Like a thunderhead over Western 
Europe is the menace of a Red Army march to the Atlantic (Hoffman 1951: 14). 
 
The ideological convergence between the Ford Foundation and the policy-
makers in Washington was confirmed when Gaither, who became the president of the 
Ford Foundation in 1953 (while remaining chairman of RAND’s board of trustees), 
was requested in 1957 by President Eisenhower’s National Security Council to chair a 
                                                 
15The Draper Committee was officially the President's Committee to Study the United States Military 
Assistance Program. It was chaired by William H. Draper, a former investment banker at the firm of 
Dillon Read, which had figured prominently in financial dealings in Nazi era Germany (Simpson 1993: 
47-49; Kolko and Kolko 1972: 113). Draper went on to play an influential role in the national and 
international population establishment, eventually becoming the head of the fund-raising arm of 
Planned Parenthood (Chase 1977: 383). 
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committee to assess U.S. military security needs (Snead 1999: 49-51). The intimate 
operational association between Ford and the policy elite was further consolidated 
when McCloy became chair of the Foundation in 1958. From 1953 onward, he was 
also the chairman of the Rockefeller’s Chase Manhattan and of the Council on 
Foreign Relations. Moreover, all through the 1950’s, while he headed the Foundation, 
McCloy served informally as Eisenhower’s chief political adviser and did nothing to 
discourage relations between Ford and the CIA (Bird 1992: 426-429). By the early 
nineteen-sixties, it had become routine for the CIA to channel funds through the Ford 
(and Rockefeller and Carnegie) Foundation, to give support and respectability to 
selected international projects, programs and centers that served its sense of U.S. 
strategic interests (Church Committee 1976: 182-183; Cumings 1998). 
 
 
4  THE EMERGENCE OF THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL 
STUDIES 
This was to be the case with the Russian Studies Center at Harvard. And that 
center demonstrated so well how valuable a contribution social scientists could make 
to the intelligence-gathering efforts of government, that, according to David 
Horowitz, ‘within a year a new Center for International Studies was being formed as a 
sister project on the MIT campus, with Harvard and MIT faculty (and others) 
participating’. This would be CENIS. 
According to Kai Bird, ‘Though CENIS drew on scholars throughout 
Cambridge, it had to be housed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology because 
of Harvard’s ban on classified research’ (Bird 1998: 139). But, MIT was an ideal site 
because of its existing associations with the U.S. military and industrial establishment 
(Snead 1999: 56-57). The Advisory Board on Soviet Bloc Studies at MIT included 
Allen Dulles of the CIA (Horowitz 1967). So, after the Provost of MIT, Julius Stratton 
informed his friend, Rowan Gaither, who became president of the Ford Foundation in 
1953, about plans to establish the new centre, which would attract funding from the 
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Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation, Ford – with its close ties to 
Washington – took a prominent role in the discussions that led to its creation.
16 
That the centre’s ‘ultimate aim … [was] the production of an alternative to 
Marxism’ (Rosen 1985: 27-29). was hardly surprising in light of the fact that CENIS 
was very much a product, not only of Ford, but of the CIA (Horowitz 1969; Cumings 
1998: 171-173; Bird 1998: 138-140) and that its principal staff included two students 
of the economist, Richard Bissell (Rosen 1985: 28), a former MIT professor (Bissell 
1971) who was then at Ford, but who chiefly worked for the CIA (cf. Bissell 1996). 
These were Walt Rostow, who, a decade later, was the hawkish head of Kennedy and 
Johnson’s Policy Planning Staff at the State Department (Horowitz 1969), and Max F. 
Millikan, the Centre’s head, who came in 1952 from his job as director of economic 
research at the CIA (Rosen 1985: 28; Bird 1998: 139). 
CENIS became a major source of literature on the psychology of development, 
through the works of people such as Daniel Lerner, Lucien Pye and Everett Hagen, 
whose Weberian conceptualisations of the so-called modernisation process 
emphasised the vital role of groups with ‘a rationalist and positivist spirit’ (Lerner 
1958: 45). In this sense, modernisation was virtually synonymous with Westernisation 
and participation in the capitalist world market economy. The conflicts and disruption 
which often accompanied such modernisation were, in the view promoted by the 
CENIS scholars, less the product of the inequalities which the development process 
either generated or exacerbated than of the way that new ideas clashed with the 
‘stabilizing elements in traditional society’ (Millikan and Blackmer 1961: 16).
17 The 
challenge, in their view, as Rostow would observe in a talk to the graduating class of 
the Counter Guerilla Course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was for the West to use 
the modernisation process to its own advantage while cutting off the opportunities that 
it offered Communist insurgency (Latham 2000: 167-168).  One way was to transform 
                                                 
16Stratton and Gaither had known each other since the war when they both were on the staff of 
MIT’s Radiation Lab. Stratton was a trustee of the Ford Foundation between 1955 and 1971, 
and the Foundation’s chair during the last five years of that period (MIT Libraries 1995). 
17Robert McNamara described modernisation as ‘the difficult transition from traditional to 
modern societies’ and worried about how a ‘sweepiong surge of development…has turned 
traditionally listless areas of the world into seething caldrons of change’ (quoted in Shafer 
1988: 80). For McNamara, modernisation was especially insidious because the Soviet Union 
and China regarded it as an ideal environment for the growth of Communism’ (McNamara 
1968: 147). 
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indigenous culture – a goal which was an open invitation to anthropology. 
The focus on the modification of traditional values also meant that CENIS 
scholars placed great emphasis on the so-called psychology of development, which 
meant that the formulators of modernisation theory produced a substantial body of 
work on communications theory and propaganda (cf. Simpson 1994). In 1951, Lerner, 
for example, had edited Propaganda in war and crisis: materials for American policy, 
and 25 years later would write an article, ‘Is International Persuasion Sociologically 
Feasible?’ for the U.S. Army publication, The art and science of psychological 
operations: case studies of military application (1976). 
 
 
5  THE FOUNDATIONS TURN TO INDIA 
Development theory was never far removed from U.S. geo-political strategy. 
And India, even more than Mexico, was of central concern, as it seemed especially 
vulnerable to communist influence. The Rockefeller Foundation had had a field office 
in New Delhi since 1935 which, between 1942 and 1946, had temporarily replaced the 
Shanghai office as the Foundation’s headquarters for the Far East; after 1949, it was 
permanently located in Bangalore (Rockefeller Foundation 1995). The nineteen-fifties 
also saw the Ford Foundation’s activities in India expand to the point where they 
overshadowed all its other programs outside the United States (Caldwell and Caldwell 
1986:4). 
The potential significance of India had been heralded by a visit to China for 
the Rockefeller Foundation by Frank Notestein, to survey ‘public health and 
demography’ in that region, on the eve of Chinese communist victory (Ryder 1984: 
13). On his return, he not only described population pressure as the ultimate source of 
rural discontent – a view that dovetailed precisely with the view of U.S. policy-
makers that the misery of the Asian peasant was chiefly a Malthusian problem of ‘too 
many people, too little land’ (Ladejinsky, in Walinsky 1977: 131) –  but, most 
importantly, concluded that, if one looked around the developing world and 
considered the impact of population on social and political stability, it was ‘The 
subcontinent of India … [that]comes most forcibly to mind as the next possible 
location for a serious outbreak of communism’ (quoted in Ryder 1984: 676). 
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There was ample reason to expect peasant insurgency in a country where rural 
conditions were so oppressive (yet where, for well over a century, famines and land 
hunger had been routinely attributed to Malthusian pressures.) Thus, peasant 
movements had become a notable feature of late colonial India. In north Bihar alone, 
there were six major peasant uprisings between 1917 and 1942 (Henningham 1982: 1-
2). Most such movements had failed to challenge the fundamental structural 
conditions of rural poverty, until the Telangana revolt in former Hyderabad State in 
South India (in what was later part of the state of Andhra Pradesh), which began in 
1946 (Banerjee 1984: 17-19; Dhanagare 1991: 154-212). Led chiefly by the 
Communist Party of India, it threatened the economic and political structure of what 
was the largest princely state in pre-Independence India, whose despotic ruler, the 
Nizam, was one of the wealthiest men in the world. The revolt, which took place in 
the Telangana districts, where the exploitation of peasants was the most intense in the 
entire state (Dhanagare 1991: 184-189), represented ‘an agrarian liberation struggle to 
get rid of feudal landlordism and the Nizam’s dynastic rule’ (Banerjee 1984: 19): 
During the course of a struggle that continued until 1951, insurgent forces succeeded 
in distributing some one million acres of land among the peasantry (Banerjee 1984: 
19; cf. Dhanagare 1991: 200). 
Despite its eventual suppression, the coincidence of the Telangana insurrection 
with the final victory of the Chinese communists underscored the revolutionary 
potential of peasant India.
18 Indeed, in 1954, in a book published for the Council on 
Foreign Relations, Stanford economist, Eugene Staley, explicitly referred to 
Hyderabad as a potential ‘Indian Yenan’ (Staley 1954: 137; Selden 1971), in 
reference to the Chinese city which was the focal point of Mao’s communist 
movement in the thirties and forties.  In the light of such comparisons, it is hardly 
surprising, that Paul Hoffman, the new head of the Ford Foundation, wrote to the U.S. 
ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, of the need for a rural development program in 
India like the one that had been undertaken recently in Taiwan, commenting: 
                                                 
18And, even as open armed rebellion waned, the CPI began to emerge as an important electoral force in 
many regions of the country, especially as the franchise was broadened after independence (Harrison 
1960: 178-245). By 1957, it would form the government in the south-western state of Kerala (Nossiter 
1982). But, the fact that electoral success did not exclude the possibility of further uprisings became 
evident in 1967 with the short-lived Communist-led insurgency at Naxalbari in the northern part of 
West Bengal (Banerjee 1984:i). 
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If in 1945 we had embarked on such a program and carried it on at a cost of not 
over two hundred million dollars a year, the end result would have been a China 
completely immunized against the appeal of the Communists. India, in my 
opinion, is today what China was in 1945 (quoted in Rosen 1985: 11). 
 
There was another program that Hoffman drew upon as a model: the Marshall 
Plan, of which he had been the head. Well aware of the role it had played in 
suppressing an effective political role for indigenous communist parties in Europe 
(Pisani 1991), he could well writes, ‘We have learned in Europe what to do in Asia.’ 
(quoted in Raffer and Singer 1996: 61). 
Bowles heartily concurred with Hoffman’s warning and in an article in 
Foreign Affairs, the journal of the Council on Foreign Relations, he himself 
underscored the supreme importance of what would happen now in India. ‘[T]he 
success or failure’, he wrote, 
of the effort being made in India and other Asian countries to create an alternative 
to Communism in Asia may mark one of those historic turning points which 
determine the flow of events for many generations... 
 
The future of Asia, and eventually the world balance of power, may rest on the 
competition between democratic India on the one hand and Communist China on 
the other. If democracy succeeds in India, regardless of what happens in China, 
millions of Asian doubters will develop new faith in themselves, in their ancient 
cultures, and in the ideals of the free world (Bowles 1952:80). 
 
The solution was more or less what the Rockefeller Foundation had learned 
from its decades in China, working with Cornell-trained agricultural missionaries, 
when it evolved a strategy of rural development as a source of economic and social 
stability, which 
eschewed social revolution—and most notably was silent on the issue of land 
reform. But it provided unique support for those who sought to change the 
conditions of life in village China (Thomson 1969:150). 
 
A crucial element in this scenario was the view that peasants could not themselves be 
the principal agents of change. Thus, as it looked around for a special professional 
niche in the post-war geo-political climate, one of anthropology’s notable 
contributions to the Western discourse of the Cold War era – and especially to the 
modernization theory which gave credence to Western policies – turned out to be 
precisely its conceptualization of peasant conservatism. Through such constructions 
as George Foster’s ‘Image of the Limited Good’ etc., the view took shape that 
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peasants were more constrained by ‘tradition’ than by agrarian structures and 
therefore could not really be expected ‘to improve their living standards at their own 
initiative’ (cited in Huizer 1972: 53). 
 
 
6  THE VICOS PROJECT, CARNEGIE AND THE COLD WAR 
Even before the idea of peasant conservatism had taken shape, anthropology 
was pre-adapted to carry such ideas into the developing world by locating itself within 
what would become the post-war structures of community development. Among 
these, the so-called Vicos Project, run by Cornell University in the Peruvian 
highlands, was perhaps the prime example. In this project, Cornell anthropologists 
became the managers of a hacienda that was owned and rented out by a Public 
Welfare Society, located in the town of Huaraz, the capital of the Andean department 
of Ancash (Stein 1985:233-236).
19 Within a short time, the so-called Peru-Cornell 
Project at Vicos – initially run by Allan Holmberg – achieved near-legendary status. 
George Foster, for one, would write that ‘the history of the project tells much about 
the problems of development and modernization of a traditional community’ (1966). 
What neither he nor anyone else ever said was what Vicos could also tell us 
about post-war anthropology.  Specifically, how did anthropology, during the decades 
of the Cold War, help to develop arguments that denied the necessity of peasant-
driven, radical agrarian transformation and how, within the accepted framework of 
modernisation theory, did it gave stature to an alternative, gradual process of what the 
Vicos personnel liked to call ‘controlled change’? 
Latin America had, of course, long been a prime concern of U.S. strategists, 
but the Second World War certainly intensified this.  So, between 1943, when it was 
established, and 1952, when it ceased to exist, the Washington-based Institute of 
Social Anthropology (ISA), where George Foster embarked on his career in applied 
anthropology, had as one of its principal aims ‘to keep Latin America within the U.S. 
political orbit’ (Adams 1964: 2). When it was disbanded, most of the anthropologists 
working there went to work for the International Cooperation Agency (ICA), the 
                                                 
19Huaraz was destroyed by an earthquake in 1970 (Stein 1985: 234). 
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predecessor of USAID.
20 The ICA – like its successor, USAID – was closely 
connected with the CIA and, as Adams observes, 
 
Within the ICA, anthropologists in Bolivia and southern Peru were, I presume, 
more than coincidentally, utilized in areas where there were thought to be serious 
problems of communist agitation (Adams 1964:2). 
 
So, anthropologist Allen Holmberg, a Yale contemporary of Goodenough, a 
student of George Peter Murdock and one of his assistants in the creation of the 
Human Relations Area Files (Doughty personal communication), had emerged from 
the Bolivian tropical lowlands, where he had studied the Sirionó during the early 
nineteen-forties (Holmberg 1950: 1-3), to finish his doctoral dissertation at Yale in 
1947 and to initiate the Cornell-Peru Project just a few years later. 
According to Henry Dobyns, a prominent member of the project, ‘The 
Cornell-Peru Project has been, throughout its history, a cooperative effort of the 
Peruvian Indian Institute … and Cornell University represented by Allan Holmberg’ 
(Discussion 1962: 122). But, not unexpectedly, there were other actors as well. Thus, 
in 1962, Cornell sociologist, William F. Whyte, remarked that he had ‘had occasion to 
see Allan Holmberg working in Peru, constantly in touch with various levels and 
agencies of the Peruvian government and ICA’ (Discussion 1962: 122). 
The project was, from the start, funded by the Carnegie Corporation. Carnegie 
had been one of the principal funders of the Human Relations Area File, so Holmberg 
would have had relatively easy access. Moreover, Charles Dollard, the president of 
Carnegie (and one of the original trustees of the RAND corporation) was the brother 
of one of Holmberg’s Yale supervisors, psychologist John Dollard (Simpson 1994: 
58-59; Holmberg 1950: 1; RAND Corporation). 
Project members always freely admitted Carnegie support because Carnegie’s 
links to the U.S. intelligence community were not yet widely known. But, we now 
know that the Carnegie Corporation was a major supporter of such U.S. government 
intelligence-oriented projects as the Russian Research Center at Harvard (Diamond 
1992: 65-80), which had arisen out of its long-standing and intimate associations with 
                                                 
20Beals (1964: 186) refers to Louis Miniclier, who served as the head of the Community Development 
Division of the ICA from 1954, when the division was founded, to 1964, as ‘the nation’s largest 
employer of anthropologists.’ 
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the U.S. power elite. Indeed, at the time that the Center was established, Carnegie’s 
president, Devereaux Josephs, was spoken about as one of the most influential 
individuals in the country (Horowitz 1969). So, it is not surprising that any project 
such as Vicos that had the backing of Carnegie was also funded by USAID and the 
U.S. Department of Defense (Colby and Dennett1995: 871). Or that it represented 
more than it first seemed. 
 
 
7  THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION AND THE CIA 
If Clyde Kluckhohn was a strategic bridge between professional post-war 
anthropology and the intelligence industry, it was the Carnegie Corporation which 
connected the two at an even more profound level, where the interests of the U.S. 
power elite brought unity to a seeming diversity of people and aims. 
The Russian Studies Center was just one conspicuous example of the Carnegie 
Corporation’s role as a source of funding of projects of interest to the ruling class 
(Trumpbour 1989: 66). As in the case of the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, that 
particular affinity had long been reflected, on a less public level, by the fact that it was 
a major sponsor of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), with which its presidents 
and trustees had been associated since the 1920’s (Feldman 2002; Oppenheimer 
1997).
21. And, when the RAND Corporation was created in 1948, psychologist 
Charles Dollard, the then president of Carnegie, was on its first board of trustees 
(RAND 2003; Simpson 1994:58). 
So, as Oppenheimer (1997) notes, Carnegie ‘was not entirely a dispassionate 
funder of educational and scientific projects’. As a result, it had come about that, in 
July 1947, when Carnegie Vice President Gardner was in Washington to assess the 
state of government research on the Soviet Union, he learned that the State 
Department and the Central Intelligence Group, a forerunner of the CIA, would be 
interested in the creation of a Russian center (Oppenheimer 1997). Through the rest of 
that year and into the next, Gardner had frequent discussions with the CIA. 
                                                 
21According to Trumpbour (1989: 66), ‘A 1971 study identified fourteen out of nineteen directors of 
the Rockefeller Foundation and ten out of seventeen of the Carnegie Corporation’s directors as 
belonging to the CFR … [while] the Ford Foundation … was run from 1966 to 1977 by CFR members 
…  
 
  18 
 
Gardner must have felt at home. He himself had been a member of the OSS 
during the war—before joining Carnegie as executive associate in 1946 and becoming 
president in 1955, a role he continued in until 1965, when he became US Secretary of 
Health, Education and Welfare (Smith 1972: 29). So, when Harvard was selected as 
the location for the new Russian center, it was not odd that the non-Russian specialist, 
Clyde Kluckhohn, was appointed to direct it.  Kluckhohn had other credentials. 
Like Talcott Parsons, who was also drawn into the Center, during the early 
thirties Kluckhohn had been a participant in Harvard’s Pareto seminar, which, 
according to Gouldner, ‘was clearly searching for a theoretical defence against 
Marxism’ (Gouldner 1970: 149) and had managed to come up with the Italian 
economist, Vilfredo Pareto, who was an early supporter of Mussolini and his fascist 
movement.
22 Kluckhohn had also been in the OSS (Horowitz 1967) and knew 
Gardner; both had been members of the OSS’s psychological group – Gardner had a 
PhD in psychology and Kluckhohn had published in the field – which played an 
important role in the organization’s recruitment process (OSS Assessment 2003). 
Conveniently, Kluckhohn, who had also been elected President of the American 
Anthropological Association in 1947, had ‘top secret’ security clearance from the 
R&D Board of the new Department of Defence and was actively involved in Air 
Force Intelligence projects. 
Beyond Kluckhohn, Harvard was a leading focus of OSS alumni who sought 
to maintain their war-time connections with Washington (Diamond 1992: 73), so 
there was much to commend it as the site for the new centre, in the eyes of both the 
CIA and Carnegie officials. Accordingly, after Gardner secured a grant from the 
Carnegie Corporation's Trustees, the Russian Research Center at Harvard came into 




                                                 
22Another member of the seminar was the sociologist, George Homans. In the nineteen-thirties, 
engaged in a political debate in Massachusetts with a Democratic and Socialist, he reports how ‘The 
Socialist quoted Marx at me; I quoted Pareto back’ (1984: 102). 
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8  THE CORNELL CONNECTION 
Another major figure at Carnegie was James Perkins, who had joined in 1950 
as an executive associate and became vice president a year later. In 1951-52, he took a 
brief leave to serve as the deputy chair of the Research and Development Board of the 
Department of Defense (Cornell) and in 1957 served as a member of the Gaither 
Committee (Snead 1999: 47; Domhoff 1970: 135). He would later become a director 
of Chase Manhattan, the Rockefeller bank, and of Nelson Rockefeller’s International 
Basic Economy Corporation (IBEC), the family’s highly diversified vehicle for 
investment in Latin America, promoting Green Revolution-style seeds and inputs 
(Colby and Dennett 1995: 474, 784-786). He was also on the Board of Trustees of the 
RAND Corporation and was for many years a director of the Council of Foreign 
Relations (Melanson 2003). 
Perkin’s ascendancy to the presidency of Cornell in 1963 consolidated that 
university’s historic role as a key player in foundation-sponsored agrarian change, 
dating from early in the twentieth century when it was the favoured training ground 
for agricultural missionaries such as John Lossing Buck (Ross 1998: 141). When the 
Philippines – as a country whose U.S.-backed regime had long been challenged by 
leftist guerrillas – was targeted for the Green Revolution and the Rockefeller and Ford 
Foundations decided to establish a rice research centre there ‘to help solve the world 
food problem in such a way that [their] economic and political concerns about Asia 
would be allayed’ (Anderson et al. 1991: 1), it was set up at the College of 
Agriculture at Los Baños, which, since 1952, was virtually a ‘special project of 
Cornell University’ (Ramon Magsaysay Foundation 1977; Pomeroy 1974: 106-107). 
When the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) was finally created at Los 
Baños in 1960, Robert Chandler, former Cornell Professor of Agronomy and 
Associate Director for Agriculture of the Rockefeller Foundation, became the center’s 
first director (Chandler 1992: 79; Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation 1969); and, 
in 1963, Cornell’s former provost, Forrest Hill, then vice president of the Ford 
Foundation, became its Chairman of the Board (Anderson et al. 1991: 48; Chandler 
1992). 
Meanwhile, in India, where the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations played a 
major role in defining its ‘population problem’ and gave priority to the Green 
Revolution as the solution, and where Ford staff were a major influence on the 
country’s Planning Commission (Bowles 1954: 340), Cornell became the first U.S. 
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university to establish – with Ford sponsorship – an anthropological project (in 1953), 
which was led by Morris Opler. It was set in Uttar Pradesh (then called United 
Provinces) and had as it chief objective to examine ‘the impact of the community 
development program at the local level’ (Rosen 1985: 35). 
But, there was more than this.  In the early years of Independence, UP had 
been the location of India’s first experiments in what was called ‘community 
development’. In 1947, a pilot project had been initiated in Etawah district. Its appeal, 
as George Rosen has observed, was that it met ‘the political need of the Congress 
[Party] to do something to improve conditions in the rural areas’ (Rosen 1985: 49) 
which were then marked by great unrest. ‘If it was successful’, he wrote, 
 
It would serve as a model for meeting the revolutionary threats from 
left-wing and communist peasant movements demanding basic social 
reforms in agriculture (Rosen 1985: 49).
23 
 
By the early fifties, the so-called Etawah Project seemed so effective that Paul 
Hoffman, head of the Ford Foundation proclaimed that ‘There is no reason why all 
500,000 of India’s villages could not make a similar advance’ (quoted in Rosen 1985: 
11). Of course there was. But, both Ford and the Rockefeller Foundation nonetheless 
offered to sponsor a nation-wide Community Development programme modelled on 
Etawah (Rosen 1985:50 because, among other reasons, according to Robert Chandler, 
 
It was feared that rapidly increasing population pressure in relation to 
food supplies in South and Southeast Asia would result in the 
developing countries falling into the Communist camp (Chandler 1992: 
5) 
 
Eventually, the U.S. government and Ford would provide more than $100 
million for such programs during the course of India’s First and Second Plans in the 
nineteen-fifties (Brown 1971: 4). U.S. anthropologists would play an important role in 
these programs, with Cornell’s India Project under Opler being a major framework for 
many of them (Cohen 1955: 53). 
                                                 
23The Communist Party of India (CPI) had been founded in December, 1925, at an all-India conference 
held in Uttar Pradesh. But, more than that UP had a long tradition of a peasant unrest and protest. 
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9  VICOS: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS ‘CONTROLLED 
CHANGE’ 
Peru was where the idea of Community Development Programs would find 
expression just a few years after the establishment of the Russian Studies Center, 
when Carnegie combined forces with Cornell, to create the Cornell-Peru Vicos 
Project.that George Foster would describe as ‘as a milestone in the development of 
applied social science’. 
Goodenough went further when he characterised the project, which was run in 
association with the Instituto Indigenista Peruano, as ‘a very visible example’ of 
where ‘cultural knowledge has been successfully used to accomplish objectives that 
would have been unattainable without it’ (Goodenough 1962: 174). Though today it is 
one of the most famous cases in the annals of applied anthropology, Goodenough’s 
comment – taken together with his ideas about how anthropology should make itself 
relevant in the cause of counter-insurgency – should be taken as a point of departure 
to consider the deeper import of Vicos. 
Even today, these questions are not easy to answer. We know that the major 
overt support for the Cornell-Peru project, which involved the running of a hacienda 
in the central Andes, came from the Carnegie Corporation. What is less often noted is 
that the Peru project was actually one aspect of a larger study funded by Carnegie – 
but also with support from USAID – in which Cornell anthropologists Lauristen 
Sharp, Morris Opler, John Adair and Allan Holmberg sought to compare the process 
of modernization in Thailand, India, Peru and on a Navajo reservation in the U.S. 
(Keyes 1994). Twenty years later, Sharp’s work in Thailand would raise questions 
about its relationship to U.S. counter-insurgency efforts, which were associated with 
USAID (Wolf and Jorgensen 1970). Surprisingly little effort has been made to submit 
Holmberg’s work to deeper scrutiny, however. 
Yet, there is much about the Vicos project which is contradictory, starting with 
the published references to when it actually began—1949 or 1952. What is clear is 
that it began after Peru had been taken over by a military coup. In 1945, a coalition of 
liberal and leftist parties, including the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana 
(APRA) had elected José Luis Bustamante y Rivero as president (1894-1989). 
Bustamante instituted numerous liberal reforms and certain dictatorial powers of the 
presidency were abolished by constitutional amendment. But, in October 1948, 
rightist revolutionary leaders unseated Bustamante, seized the government and 
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outlawed APRA. On July 2, 1950, General Manuel A. Odría (1897-1974), the leader 
of the 1948 coup d’état, was elected president, without any effective opposition. He 
remained in power until 1956. 
It is hardly to Holmberg or Cornell's credit that it was during Odria’s rule that 
the Vicos project was initiated. Nor does Paul Doughty's comment (in a footnote) in 
1987 reflect any serious political concerns on the part of the Cornell team: 
 
Just why the conservative Odria dictatorship would permit such a project to begin 
with was often conjectured by the CPP personnel, but plausible reasons or policy 
have never been identified (Doughty 1987: 441). 
 
Yet, Doughty himself gave part of the answer when he pointed out that 
 
In 1960, Indian communities and haciendas serf populations were increasingly 
pressuring the government to take action on land reform. The government 
response was invariably hostile to these efforts and on the adjacent hacienda of 
Huapra, Vicosinos and CPP personnel were witness to a political massacre of serfs 
who were attempting to construct a school ‘like Vicos’ (Doughty 1987: 444). 
 
Land reform in Peru had been a political issue since the period immediately 
after the First World War, but was resisted by the ruling oligarchy (Lastarria-Cornhiel 
1989: 127). The lack of any effective democratization of land holding in the highlands 
eventually gave birth to an era of peasant mobilization, the most notable of which was 
led by Hugo Blanco (Lastarria-Cornhiel 1989: 136; Colby and Dennett 1995: 69). 
There is no doubt that Holmberg, Henry Dobyns, etc. and their Peruvian partners 
(after all, the Instituto Indigenista Peruano included army generals on its executive 
board) were aware of such developments. In fact, in a 1962 paper, Dobyns and others 
noted that, in the departmental capital of Huaraz, there was resistance to the Vicos 
project from the Communist Party ‘which appears to recognize that every success of 
the project diminishes by that much their chances of fomenting a violent revolution’ 
(Dobyns et al. 1962: 112-113). There is little doubt that the U.S. was equally aware of 
this possibility. 
Thus, in the period immediately following the Cuban Revolution and 
especially after the failure of U.S.-backed armed intervention at the Bay of Pigs, the 
Vicos model grew in importance. This was readily apparent in John Gillin’s 
observation to the Society of Applied Anthropology, that 
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The experience of Vicos contains numerous suggestions for the 'cold war.' 
Through our foreign-aid programs, I presume that we are trying to bring the 
peoples of the modern world to our side. The numerous defects in our national 
programs can be corrected on the basis of the experience of Vicos (Gillin in 
Informaciones 1961: 142). 
 
Gillin had learned his lessons from Guatemala. In 1954, he had watched as the 
U.S. backed the overthrow of the progressive, elected president of Guatemala, Jácobo 
Arbenz, and, in a 1960 work published by the Council on Foreign Relations, Social 
Change in Latin America Today, he had effectively endorsed that coup as a necessary 
response to the fact that the Arbenz government had been a ‘Communist-dominated 
regime’ (Adams 1960: 270, 274).
24 
In fact, this was just an argument that had been constructed for the purposes of 
Washington policy-makers by the Council itself, under the leadership of John J. 
McCloy, David Rockefeller and Allen Dulles, men who had powerful interests in 
Guatemala (Ross 1998b:481).
25, 26 The study group on "Political Unrest in Latin 
America" that the CFR had called in response to Arbenz’s land reform efforts was led 
by Spruille Braden, the son of a copper magnate who had spent most of his life 
representing the interests of multinational corporations, had been U.S. ambassador to 
Argentina and Colombia, had served as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, and whose arch-conservatism would later reveal itself in his 
leading role in the John Birch Society during the nineteen-fifties (Cockcroft 1989; 
Braden 1971). Above all, he had been a spokesperson for the United Fruit Company, 
whose corporate interests in Guatemala were really the issue. 
                                                 
24Even earlier, in 1956, Gillin had co-authored an essay with Kalman Silvert, called ‘Ambiguities in 
Guatemala’, published in Foreign Affairs, which argued that Guatemala under Arbenz had been so 
deeply influenced by communists that ‘it matters little whether the President or other outstanding 
members of his givernment actually carried Party cards or not’ (Gillin and Silvert 1956: 472. A decade 
later, Silvert became the head of the Ford-sponsored Latin American Studies Association; he 
subsequently became the programme advisor on Latin America for the Ford Foundation (Horowitz 
1969). 
25And promoted by all the means of modern advertising. Indeed, the veritable father of that field, 
Edward Bernays, had advanced this argument on behalf of United Fruit (Streeter 2002; Bernays 1965). 
26David Rockefeller, of course, represented the family’s interests which had a strong Latin American 
focus. Allen Dulles and his brother, John Foster Dulles, both had worked for the prominent New York 
law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, when the latter drafted United Fruit’s 1936 contract with the Ubico 
dictatorship which granted the company a ninety-nine year lease with large tax emptions.  Foster was 
later the head of the Rockefeller Foundation, until 1952 when he became Eisenhower’s Secretary of 
State, while Allen became head of the CIA. McCloy, the former head of the World Bank, had become 
the chairman of the Rockefeller Bank, Chase Manhattan, and sat on United Fruit’s Board (Colby and 
Dennett 1995:849; Ross 1998:121-122) 
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Although the CFR volume in 1960, to which Gillin and Richard Adams both 
contributed, had been planned earlier, it was the Cuban Revolution that ultimately 
brought it to light (Adams 1964: 2). In his essay, Gillin had not only reflected the 
dominant Cold War perspective which had countenanced the overthrow of Arbenz – 
the outcome of a CIA operation called PBSUCCESS (Cullather 1994) – but also 
showed that he understood the problems the U.S. faced as a result of its intervention 
against the Arbenz government when he wrote that, although ‘Communists and fellow 
travellers had succeeded in infiltrating and practically taking over the government’ – a 
highly contentious view even then (NACLA 1954), let alone in terms of later 
evidence
27 
it is still widely believed throughout Latin America that the US government or its 
agents engineered and financed this ‘liberación’, and this belief has been exploited 
so successfully by Communist and other antagonists of the United States that the 
‘Yankee Colossus’ has suffered a severe loss of prestige (Gillin 1960: 17-18). 
 
The point obviously was to devise more subtle forms of intervention. The 
Vicos project, which Gillin hailed, was certainly one of these. 
 
 
10 HAROLD  LASSWELL  JOINS THE VICOS TEAM 
It is instructive that Vicos eventually attracted the attention and support of a 
figure such as Harold Lasswell, then at the Yale University Law School. In the late 
1920’s, Lasswell – along with Edward Bernays and Walter Lippmann (Simpson 1994: 
16) – had been one of the pioneers, not just of the nascent field of public relations, but 
of the techniques of propaganda and, as it was sometimes called, ‘psychological 
warfare’ (Simpson 1994: 43-44).
28 By the fifties, he was working closely with such 
people as Abraham Kaplan and his former students, Nathan Leites, of the RAND 
Corporation – where Lasswell was a ‘permanent consulation’ for a quarter of a 
century (Oren 2000: 553) – -and Daniel Lerner of CENIS, who would become ‘a 
fixture at Pentagon-sponsored conference on U.S. psychological warfare in the Third 
World during the 1960s and 1970s’ (Simpson 1994: 84). Lasswell, who had become a 
                                                 
27Even the Arbenz land reform programme has since been described as a modest one in which ‘only 
uncultivated land could be expropriated and then only from large farms” and which never even sought 
to eliminate private property (Thiesenhusen 1995:76;  Handy 1994:87-89; Dunkerley 1988:148) 
28Lasswell’s PhD dissertation, published in 1927, was entitled Propaganda Technique in the World 
War (Almond 1987:269. 
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member of the influential Council for Foreign Relations, was also on the planning 
committee which directed the disbursement of a substantial Ford Foundation grant for 
CENIS’s communication studies which, as Simpson observes, ‘were from their 
inception closely bound up with both overt and covert aspects of U.S. national 
security strategy of the day’ (Simpson 1994: 82-83). 
In the twenties and thirties, Lasswell also had been involved in studies of the 
relationship between politics, power and personality (Almond 1987: 253-257), which 
brought him into contact with a number of notable anthropologists, including Edward 
Sapir, whom he met and with whom he collaborated at Chicago, until Sapir moved to 
Yale in 1931 (Darnell and Irvine nd). Some fifteen years later, just after the Second 
World War, Lasswell took up an appointment at Yale as well, in the law school 
(Almond 1987: 261), and where he may have come into contact with Allan Holmberg 
who completed his doctoral dissertation there in 1946. But, Lasswell’s official interest 
in Vicos ‘dates from his contact with Allan R. Holmberg when both were Fellows of 
the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in 1954-55’ (Dobyns, 
Doughty and Lasswell 1971: 237).
29 According to Doughty, the two men 
 
apparently hit it off right from the start, both having complementary backgrounds 
at Yale, in Bronislaw Malinowski who had been at Yale, in development issues 
and comprehensive, wholistic [sic] approaches to human issues.  They also shared 
common interests in areas of the social psychology of that era, and in the central 
issue of power as it related to other value areas.  At Vicos, of course, the matter of 
power was central in understanding how the old hacienda system controlled the 
lives of the colonos in everything they did.  Consequently, Holmberg was much 
taken with Harold Lasswell’s concepts of institutional human values and their 
inter-relationships and how that could be utilized in the context of analyzing and, 
to the degree possible, guiding what the project was able to do (Doughty personal 
communication). 
 
By the sixties, with his CENIS experience still fresh, Lasswell had begun 
seriously  to address the implications of Vicos for his own work  (Lasswell 1962).  He 
                                                 
29Stanford’s Center for Advanced Study in the Berhavioral Sciences represented intersection of elite 
interests. Established in 1954 with an enormous grant from the Ford Foundation,  one of its founder 
members was Dr. Frank Stanton (who also served as one of the Centert’s trustees between 1953 and 
1971), the president of the Columbia Broadcasting System, 1946-71. Stanton was also the chair of the 
RAND Corporation, 1961-67 and one of its trustees from 1957 to 1978, in addition to serving as a 
trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation during part of this time. One of the first fellows of the Center was 
Clyde Kluckhohn. 
During this period, Lasswell also had associations with Stanford’s Hoover Institute, publishing several 
works under its auspices, co-authored with Daniel Lerner and Ithiel de Sola Pool. 
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did some research at Vicos (Dobynhs, Doughty and Lasswell 1971: 237) and 
collaborated with Holmberg on a ‘general theory of directed value accumulation and 
international development’ (Lasswell and Holmberg 1966), – very much in the 
CENIS vein – and, by the mid-sixties, was such an intimate part of the Vicos group, 
that he co-edited one of its most important products, Peasants, power and applied 
social change: vicos as a model (1971; orig. 1964), with Henry Dobyns and Paul 
Doughty, two of the project’s foremost anthropological members (Dobyns, Doughty 
and Lasswell 1971). 
By the early fifties, Lasswell – who would use Vicos to shape his notion of the 
‘policy sciences’, that is of social sciences that could meaningfully contribute to the 
formulation of policy – had already developed his concept of the ‘continuing policy 
(or decision) seminar’ which was ‘concerned with working out the implications of the 
contextual, problem-oriented, multi-method approach’ as a means of informing and 
guiding the direction of an on-going project. Vicos played a major role in his 
elaboration of this technique. As a result, 
 
One of the earliest explicit seminars was installed at Stanford in 1954-55 as a 
means of aiding Holmberg in his reassessment of the project as a whole.   
Cooperating with Holmberg were a political scientist, a psychologist, and an 
economist. They met regularly for the academic year in the same environment and 
developed a chart room to provide an auxiliary to recall and to effect the concept 
of systematic study (Lasswell 1971: 191). 
 
While this all sounds highly academic, Lasswell’s own career – and 
particularly his centrality in the emergence of modernisation theory and his 
membership in the CFR – should remind us that there was more going on here than 
neutral social science. As developed at CENIS, where it was sponsored by the Ford 
Foundation and the CIA, modernisation theory played an important role in the U.S. 
strategy of dealing with the nature of change in the developing world from the 
perspective of its social and economic elite. As such, it was also closely allied with 
communications theory – long patronised by the Rockefeller, Ford and Carnegie 
Foundations – which itself evolved in close association with U.S. army interests in 
propaganda/psychological warfare, as part of a multifaceted strategy to control the 
course of change in Third World societies. That it was also closely linked to the 
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general concept of ‘community development’ requires that this approach be set within 
a wider field of critical inquiry. 
If anything brought together the ideas of Rostow, Lasswell, Gillin and 
Holmberg about the development process in the context of the Cold War and 
particularly reflected the ‘prototype’ that Lasswell had in mind, it was certainly the 
Peace Corps. Created by the Kennedy Administration in early 1961, the Peace Corps 
embodied many of the salient concepts of modernization thinking. According to 
Latham, instructors assigned recruits – who went through a thorough course of 
intellectual preparation – readings such as Staley’s The future of underdeveloped 
countries and rostow’s the stages of economic growth (Latham 2000: 119-120). 
Above all, the training centered on ‘an image of the “traditional’ peasant or lower-
class urban worker that stressed both passivity and malleability’ (Latham 2000: 124) 
and placed the volunteer in much the same position as Holmberg and his colleagues, 
as the source of Western values and innovations. 
So, it was not only the case that Cornell became an important Peace Corps 
training center but that volunteers were actually placed in Vicos. When they arrived in 
Vicos in October, 1962, it was shortly after a military coup (Doughty 1964: 223), and 
 
Their jobs involved close collaboration with the development and research 
programme initiated there in 1952 by the Cornell-Peru Project. Since 1957, the 
development aspects of this program had been under the direction of the Peruvian 
Ministry of Labor and Indian Affairs and its agency, the National Plan for 
Integrating the Aboriginal Population … (Doughty 1964: 233-234). 
 
The aim of such a plan has to be seen in relationship to the peasant 
mobilisations that were taking hold in the highlands. But, if, according to one of the 
agency’s promotional brochures, research by Cornell anthropologists had concluded 
‘that young Americans fresh out of college with only three months of training can 
have a significant and lasting impact on developing societies’ (quoted in Latham 
2000: 129), it was not because they had come to promote anything so fundamental as 
land reform. Cornell’s actual management of Vicos had come to an end and the 
Vicosinos themselves had purchased the hacienda; but, the Peruvian government still 
ran a program there and Cornell staff continued to play a central role in a process of 
on-going community development which, through the influence of the Peace Corps, 
helped to ensure that change remained safely within the framework of Western aims 
and aspirations. 
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11 CONCLUSIONS 
If Vicos was specifically regarded as a model, in Lasswell’s words, for 
‘integrating communities into more inclusive systems’ its appeal in the period of the 
Cold War was that it 
 
throws light upon the strategies open to advanced industrial Nation States 
possessed of democratic ideology whose members act unofficially to assist other 
less modernized states whose body politic  is divided by heterogeneous ideologies 
and techniques that interfere with integration, modernization, and democratization 
(Lasswell 1962: 116). 
 
Such vague references to integration are perhaps more clearly defined, in 
reference to the modernization paradigm, by Holmberg’s view ‘that lack of 
integration between the Sierra and Coast meant that the enormous Sierra labour 
reserve could not be efficiently tapped as an industrial work force …’ (1982: 3). 
Along with this was an increasing concern that, if this did not happen, the 
unacceptable alternative would be mounting conflict between land-poor peasants and 
the privileged landlord class who were allied, at the national level, with the geo-
political interests of the West. 
Beyond that, there was always the question of whether the case of Vicos, 
however compelling a model it might seem to strategic thinkers such as Lasswell, was 
ever really replicable. Certainly William Foote Whyte – who was intimately 
associated with the Project – and Giorgio Alberti, came to the conclusion that 
 
Provocative as the Vicos case is, it hardly provides an intervention model that can 
be widely used.  There just are not enough available people or institutions with 
money to invest in taking over haciendas for the purpose of transforming them into 
progressive, democratic communities (Whyte and Alberti 1976: 247). 
 
Far better, in their view, for the outsider to 
 
Help organize the peasants against the hacendado and link them with other 
outsiders in this struggle.  In other words, he must become a leader or supporter of 
a peasant movement (Whyte and Alberti 1976: 247). 
 
Certainly in the early 1950’s, when the Cornell Project began, such highland 
communities were already far from the ‘traditional’ way of life that modernization 
presumed. Much of their apparent ‘backwardness’, as Gunder Frank (1967) pointed 
out, was the product of an historical process of underdevelopment—which, by the 
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nineteen-forties, had given rise to peasant mobilizations from Bolivia to the 
Philippines. But, that was not the starting-point for most anthropological analysis. 
Had it been, as Huizer has noted and as Whyte and Alberti suggested, they might have 
‘come to help [local people] to struggle against the repressive system, rather than with 
minor improvement schemes’ (Huizer 1972: 53). Most anthropologists tended to 
adopt the Rostow model, with its roots in the CENIS view of modernization, which 
became the prevailing development paradigm in Washington when one of 
Washington’s chief strategic goals was to produce self-sustaining economic growth in 
the Third World to help immunize developing countries against agrarian insurgency 
and communism (Packenham 1973: 61-65), in particular by promoting the shift of a 
so-called rural population surplus into industrial urban centres (cf. Ross 2003). 
To the extent that anthropology subscribed to such a view, as Bonfil Batalla 
noted, it certainly ‘increased its employment possibilities’ (1966: 91). Focus on 
communities – and on the shifting of attitudes and values toward a Western standard – 
rather than on their structural context, gave anthropologists a unique vantage point 
which ensured them a professional role in the burgeoning community development 
field, even if it did little to place anthropological expertise at the service of the 
dispossessed (cf. Stein 1985: 249). 
The Vicos Project, like so much of anthropology’s contribution to community 
development, did little to address the need for structural change. Indeed, according to 
William Stein, who participated in the Cornell Project, the emphasis on cultural 
values meant that researchers viewed Vicos society ‘in terms of pluralism and cultural 
dimorphism, not as a whole, which led us to justify existing conditions and, in large 
part, to ignore the significance of exploitation’ (Stein 1985: 238). That being the case, 
it is surely worth while to ask what the Project actually was able to give to Vicosinos. 
Unfortunately, the answer is problematical at best. According to J. Oscar Alers’s short 
overview of demographic trends at Vicos, the crude death rate actually rose from 14.5 
to 24.6 per thousand between 1952 and 1963, while the infant mortality rate increased 
from 122.0 to 142.9 (Alers 1971: 199-200. Alers attributes ‘some’ of the increase in 
death rates to improved registration, but clearly not all. 
There may be some connection between these trends and the declining status 
of women. According to Florence Babb, who examined not only the Vicos literature 
but unpublished field data by project members (Babb 1985: 164), the Cornell project 
had ‘unequal consequences’ for men and women, especially in regard to productive 
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relations. In particular, she observes that ‘women’s position in Vicos has degenerated 
as ties to the dominant capitalist economy grow stronger’ (Babb 1985: 185). More 
generally, according to Babb: 
 
… men were the targets of modernization and women were affected only 
indirectly in ways which have been largely ignored in the Vicos literature … the 
male bias of Western social science and community development programs is clear 
in the Vicos Project (Babb 1985: 1 72). 
 
Thus, when new potato varieties were introduced, project personnel failed to 
take account of the role of women in the household decision-making process. In 
general, an emphasis on men in the process of agricultural innovation – particularly 
where this involved cash crops which brought about further contact with the market 
economy – was accompanied by a tendency for women to be relegated to a more 
domestic role (Babb 1985: 173187). Thus, while men acquired new ways of 
articulating with the wider world, ‛women’s work has seen little change in Vicos, as it 
is still geared to production for family use rather than for exchange in the cash 
economy’ (Babb 1985: 187). Thus, the project actually intensified the dependent 
status of women. 
Beyond gender inequalities, the project’s aim of integrating Vicosinos into the 
national economy entailed certain interventions that actually promoted a general 
process of differentiation among the peasants of Vicos. One of the first of these was 
an initiative that was closely related to Cornell’s agricultural involvements elsewhere 
in the world and one that reflected a widespread view in Western development policy 
circles that there were relatively simple technical solutions to complex socio-
economic and historical problems.
30 It was the introduction of ‘improved’ potato 
varieties. Barbara Lynch’s 1982 report for USAID on the impact of the Vicos Project 
observed that, by 1954, Vicos had already become the region’s largest potato 
producer. But, as with the Green Revolution elsewhere – whether the crop was 
potatoes,  rice  or  wheat – the  technology  required  was  not  equally  accessible;  the 
                                                 
30See above. Cornell has also had an enduring involvement both in Andean research and potato 
development. When the International Potato Center (CIP), a constituent of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research, was established in 1971, the first Director General was Richard 
Sawyer, who had been professor of vegetable crops at Cornell, 1953-1966. The current DG, Herbert 
Zandstra, has a PhD from Cornell. He was formerly deputy DG of the International Rice Research 
Institute. 
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means to develop such potatoes ‘was available only to wealthy and middle class 
Vicosinos’ so, for small-holders, ‛their relative position in the community 
deteriorated’ (Lynch 1982: iii). 
Above all, Lynch concluded that 
The successes of the project were qualified. The project was constrained by 
regional and national economic, social and political structure …Integration into the 
national society resulted in the reproduction of inequalities in the local society 
(Lynch 1982: iv). 
 
Yet, such integration had been a major aim. So, either something had gone 
seriously wrong or the professed goals of the Vicos Project were rather different from 
the real agenda. Thus, when Foster wrote that ‘the history of the project tells much 
about the problems of development and modernization of a traditional community’, 
(1966), he was probably right, but not in the way he meant. 
As Foster noted, the significance of Vicos (in part) was that ‘the 
anthropologists …were project administrators, with authority to make and execute 
decisions as well as to carry out research’ (Foster 1969: 30). But, this was just part of 
the story. What also needs to be asked is what interests and aims led to those 
decisions, what premises and assumptions justified them, and what anthropologists 
did, as individuals and/or as a discipline, to give credibility to such assumptions. How 
did anthropology give legitimacy to a view of development which, by emphasizing 
the community as a unit of analysis, denied one which looked toward large-scale 
economic and social transformation? Specifically, what relation did anthropologists’ 
engagement in projects such as Vicos have to the general geo-political strategy of the 
U.S. during the Cold War?  
U.S. foreign policy objectives over four decades since the end of the Second 
World War were founded on a set of assumptions about the parameters of what was 
called modernisation and about who should properly be the agents (and beneficiaries) 
of change. Far from doing very much to question those assumptions – particularly 
with regard to the position of peasants in rural change – anthropology did a great deal 
to enhance them. Its notion of ‘peasant conservatism’ was essential to the viability of 
the community development paradigm as an integral feature of modernisation. In so 
doing, it contributed to the making of a world in which the fate of peasants has 
become highly problematical. 
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